The Power of Design in Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propaganda, 1937-1943 by Janzen, Grace
Ouachita Baptist University
Scholarly Commons @ Ouachita
Honors Theses Carl Goodson Honors Program
2012




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/honors_theses
Part of the Art and Design Commons, and the Political History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Carl Goodson Honors Program at Scholarly Commons @ Ouachita. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ Ouachita. For more information, please contact
mortensona@obu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Janzen, Grace, "The Power of Design in Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propaganda, 1937-1943" (2012). Honors Theses. 39.
https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/honors_theses/39
SENIOR THESIS APPROVAL 
This Honors thesis entitled 




and submitted in partial fulfillment or 
the requtrements for completion of 
the Carl Goodson Honors Program 
meets the criteria for acceptance 
and has been approved by the undersigned readers. 
Dr ~,.., in Motl. the 1 dir l.l r 
lJr Bethany Hicks, second reader 
\1r Donnie Copeland. third reader 
Dr Barbara Pemberton. llonors Pr ) ·ram director 
Aprill6,2012 
Till P0\\'1 R OF Dl·.SI<.iN I?\ l':A/1 Al':ri-BOLSIII~VJK PROPAGANDA. l937-l94J 
URACI: JAN/.FN 
IHESIS PAPER 
l'ARL GOODSON IIONORS PRO(iRAM 
OliACIJilA BAPIJS'I L'NIVI R~IIY 
SPRII\G 2012 
1 
Ole N:u.i regime ha.-. gone do"11 in intamy as one of the most sclf-consciuusl}' cu~rciw 
regimes in history. \\'hen studying the J',;ational Socialist-.. men of power and intlw:ncc an: f1.1unJ 
in ahundancc. lnJividunls such n~ I litter, I limn1ler anJ llcl!s receive credit lt)f the inOucnce they 
hdd over (icnnan society during that ~:m. Organizations of individuals. such all the SA <m'-1 SS. 
an: also "ell recogni1.eJ fur their ahilit) to control the masses. But in analysis of power during 
Nazi rule. one group i~ alm,)!'t universal I) O\ erlooked: the dc.-si~;ners and grnphic arti~t of tl~ 
Mmistry of Propaganda. l'he Minister of Propaganda. Jo~cph Gochhels. and his estraordinaT)' 
c,..ccution of thorough propui-tandu campaigns have hccn discu~sed in detail. But f"'"' con~ider the 
o;uhtlc ·yet powerful dTccts of' i~ual communication in Nui poster propaganda and the 
trem~:ndous intlucnce of men like Hans "Mjolnir" Schwcit1.cr. one ofthe most rcnO\\ncd 
de-.igncr.. employed by the Minic;U: of Propaganda 'f'heir \\ork "a." \ital to the production of 
m:.lt~:rials through which the Ntlli" vinually controlled th~ opinions of the nation. The 
contributions of men such a~ Schweitzer signifkantly contrihuted to th~ success of Nati poster 
propagandaby cmphasiJ.ing srccific mc~gcs cxpr(.'Ssed in the: pieces through\ isual 
communication. often in a manner not consciousl) noticc..-d hy the vie\\er. 
J he usc of racial propaganda was a prominent component of Nazi rule in German}' . 
·1 hrough its usc. the Nazisgaincd the ability to shaj)\! and mold th~: puhlic opinion toward spccitic 
population group~ seen as threatening to the Na:~i conccptuali.t:ation of a nc'' Aryan< i~m1an 
idcntit) . The group moc;t famo~l) targeted by Nazi propaganda was the Je\\S. Ho"c"cr. "hilt.· 
anti-Scm111~ propaganda was most definitely prc\alent in !'-laJi (icrmany. propaganda \\as also 
lc\ dcd against the Bolshc\ 1b. From the 1910s on. '"ith a brid r~:mission in the yt!ar..; bctw~cn 
J9J9 and 1941. anti-Bolshc\ il-. propaganda was widespread in Gcnnan} . l'hc general mcssngcs 
that th~ Na1.i pnrty intended tu communicate about the Bol-;hc:' iks in their propaganda. anc.J 
specifically thmug.h the JX>Sh:rs they circulated.v.cre ollcn apparent through the text. Out these 
mes~ges were also expandc:d Md reinforced through vi~ual ctHnmunication. An analysis of the 
ekm\!nts of design used in Na7i anti-Bolshe\·ik poster propaganda reveals the underlying 
as~niono; the ~ali pany dc.,ircd tu cummunicate to ito; \ icv.cr~ ahuut the Bobhc .. ih. 
A number of books and aniclcs have been written about Nazi propaganda from a 
historical perspccti\e. Mo~t of these deal \\ ith the types of propaganda that the Na1b used. the 
messages thut they i ntendcd to convey. and the historical context of the propaganda pie..:es. 
Joseph Gocbbcls and the Ministry of Propaganda arc also v.dl n:prcscnted in historiographic 
literature. Several writer~ have even cxplorcdthe u~· of visual propagnndn and symbolism in 
Nazi Germany n~ advenising and branding campaigns. Two notnhlc examples of this type of 
\\Ork arc IU. Altenholt:n · s 1111ide ... Solace in Symbols: DiS<:O\Cring. Cultural Meanings in 
S}mholic Propaganda .. 1 and an artidc h> r\icholas o·shaughne'is~ cnuth:d .. Selling llitlcr: 
propaganda and the N.ui brand .. ~. The~ \\orks examine the Notional Socaalisb as an hi~toric:al 
example of a marketing campaign and review the methods of cstablishing the ~aJ.i party brand. 
of which the\ isual clements wen~ a component. But the main J(lCus ofth~~ works is the broad 
topic of marketing, and do nut uddrcs~ the graphic design clements spcciJically. \\ hik there arc 
1 rhb article prm ides an examination of the I• '\ Y logo as a pie..:c of propaganda fwm a 
hi~torical socmlog1cal perspective. Altcnholcn discus~s the cultural had. ground of New York 
City at the time the logo v.as de~igncd. and points out ho\\ design clement., , .. crc used to send 
message~ that the '>late of Nc\\ York believed \\auld increa..,c tourism. I he art ide invuh cs Na1i 
pmpaganda h~ dr,l\\ mg cornpdri,~m., bct\\ccn the techniques used in the J•N Y logo and \ i~ual 
!:>~ mbob used b) the German ~ational Socialists. mo!:>t notably thc usc nf h~ pcrbc.llc and the 
.. band,,ag.on tcc hnu.tue ··. 
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~ o·shnughnc.,s) ·' unac.:lc cxc1mines the ~azi part~ as u mttrkcting campaign. llc outlines 
the ··produce (the idelllog~ of I hth:r ~md tbc National Socialists). and then looks at r\a7i 
propaganda a..-. the m.trJ..cttng tool used tu sell th~ product to the Gcmmn pcoph:. I he artidc 
discussc~ the message., the t\a1is inkndcd to marJ..et through pnlpaganda. and lht: usc of Je\"S 
and Bolshl.!\ ih as .. the t:ncmy .. to create f.:ar. thus making th~ .. product .. of r\aJ.1 idc0logy more 
appealing. 
3 
plenty of published ''orb that di~uss the historical conh!'\t of N:vi propaganda and the 
messages behind the propaganda pieces, there is nothing that spcctlically ani.llyt..es th~ \'isual 
dement!-. and design prim.:iplcs thnt were us~d to enhance these messages. The purpose of this 
essay is to synthesize the htstoncal contc:xt and grc1phic <.1'--sign clements of Nnzi :mti·Bt)bhe" ik. 
propaganda and hridgc the gap bctY.ccn historiograph) and visual analysis. 
• • 
In order to uncovu th~ 'isual communi~.:ation cm~ddcd in the propaganda of the Na:;ri 
pany regarding the Bobhcvik~. one must consider the historical conte'<t of the propagand:t 
pieces. The functioning of the Na1i Ministl) of Propaganda 3!-. wt!ll ao; the changes in the political 
relationship hctwecnGermany and the So' iet Union pia~ an imponant role in detcnnining the 
meanings that were conveyed through the usc of design principles in ~azi prupaganda. 
The Reich,propuJ!amlaleitunJ! Na7i Ministry of Public Enlightenment and 
Propaganda - was a very organized operation. in "hich Joseph Oocbbcls. the Minister uf 
Propaganda. micromanag~d C\ c~ ru.pcct. The u~ uf pn.1paganda b) a modem government '"as 
~till rdath.d) novel. having ~en dc\'elopcd most signiticantl~ during World War I. In the time 
~mccn 1914 and I 918. !loth the Central Powers i.lnd the Allies began to empiO) propaganda in 
thdr wur ciTons. Propagandu fullillcd several dill~rcnt fun~tinns when used by the gowrnments 
during the ,.,nr. It \\<lS used by both sides to .. rally the home front and the soldiery in 'iuppon of 
the \\ar. mamtain or tx>o~t momlc. \\C:4lkcn the enemy's will to light. and "in over puhlic opinion 
in neutral eountnes:..J Antt-<icnnan propaganda '"as uS\.-d to great cfTect by the Allies in World 
War I. nnd llitkr remembered the successful tactics of the llnitcd States and Britain when 
integrating the use ofpropoganda into hi~ o\\n regime. llith:r C!\tahli-;heJ the GcmHm Ministry of 
3 Steven Lucken and Susan Bachrach. Stult' ~~1 f>t•ccpthm the power of No:i pro{XJgundu 
(Washington. DC: t·nitcd State~ Holocaust ~1cmorial Museum. 2009). 2. 
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Propaganda when he became Chancellor in 1933. Its approach to creating propaganda messages 
was heavily influenced by what Hitl~r deemed to be the successful strategies of British and 
American anti-German propaganda in World War I. which. in his 
mind. significantly contributed to the Gem1an defeat. lie outlined 
these reasons for British and American propaganda success in .Mein 
Kampf: and Gocbbcls incorporated these strategies into Nazi 
propaganda in World War II. Chief among these methods were the 
simplistic. emotionaL straightforward presentation of content, the 
emphasis on a few key points. the honing in on one common enemy. 
and the dehumanizing and demonizing of that enemy ... 
The Ministry of Propaganda used a variety of outlets to 
spread propaganda to the German people. While the\ isual aspects 
World War I rcuuttm~·nt poster for 
th~· l'nitcd States Arm~. Hitler and 
(iochhds appropnat~-d th~· use of 
cmottonallsrn and dchumani / . .all on 
llf the cn~m~ rn carl) Amcncan 
pr,1pagand~ for lh~· produclwn of 
Na11 propaganda. 
of propaganda were manifested mostly through posters and film. 
~azi propagandists also used radio and campaign speeches. books. placards, leaflets. brochures 
and word of mouth as methods by which to influence public opinion. Goebbels was very aware 
ofthe German public mindsct on issues, and the propaganda campaigns retlccted and directed 
these opinions. lie held conferences almost daily in \.\hich ht! communicated with the leaders of 
the Ministry of Propaganda the messages that \\ere to be conveyed through the various types of 
propaganda to present a uni tied campaign. 
In the mt:ssages of Nazi anti-Bolshe\'ik propaganda. there v.as a strong and conscious 
association between Bolshevism and the Jews. thus combining two of the NaLi party's enemies 
to created one enemy that the German people could rally against. This affiliation was 
_.Ibid. 14. 
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accomplished b~ the dairn that .. the Bolshc:\ iks ''ere the: archet~ pes of · Jewish criminal it)·. the 
scum of suhhumanity. an anti-Y.orld of loathsome hatred and pcrvcnc:d envy. committed to the 
destruction of everything good nnd hcautiful ... s Historian Ro~rt E. I kr~:stcin also put l~mh that 
Bobhc\ism was .. a doctrinl.' Y.hi~h ~cures the: World War of the Jl!ws.'-61n Afeinl\amt~f. Hitler 
as-,ert~d that .. (Germans) ought tu rcl·ognize the kind ofaucmpt ''hich is being made by the Jews 
in the t\.\Cnticth century to secure dominion over the world."7 lie daimed that they had hegun 
this campaign in Russia. and \\ere next turning their sights to Gcmtan) . 
I he u~ uf anti-Bolshc\ ik propaganda by the Na7is mirrored the politicnl relationship of 
G~rmany and the So' iet Union. ln the time between the world wars. there Y.as stmin hcl\\Ccn 
<i.:rmany and the Bolsheviks. Gem1an feelings toward Russian~ had tmditionall) been "a 
m1xturc of superiority and tear. '"11Vcry early in the existence of the ~vj party. Bulshe\ ;,m '"as 
targeted a.-. an enemy. Anthon) R. Rhodes. a Britio;h scholar.'\tatcs that ... by 1921. anti-
Communism "as tim1b cstahli~hcd a.' one of the major th~mcs of Nui propaganda:'il Anti-
BoJ..,he\ ik propaganda addrcSS\.'tl the Bolshc\ iks as hnth a political entity and a racial group. rhc 
Nati('nal Sodnlists emphasized the "stab-in-the·back" legend to enhance the ncgati' c feelings of 
the Ot:rman public tov.ard communism. especiall) during their campaign for power. According 
to this ll·gcnJ. the n.'usnn lhr the <icmmn defeat in World Wnr I and the resulting hur-.h 
repercussions against Gcnnan "a.' the hetra) al of ( icnnan I ell io;t ' · 1 0This marked the beginning of 
Na.1 i mistrust of and animosity to"ards communism. After the J'rcaty of Non·A~ression 
~ Roocn Edwin Hcr.l~"tcin. 711C! War That 1/iller Won <im:Mt<'l\ and lht· .\'cd .\lt•clta 
Campai~.rn (New York: Paragon House. 1987}. ) 5 I. 
11 Ibid. 364· 5. 
7 /h) nck A.B /.cman. Na:i Propa~anda (London: Oxford University Press. 1 (}64 ). 84. 
8 i\ nlht'"' Ric.: hard Rhmk'\. /'ropuxmula (NC\\ York . <. he I ' ca I louse Publishers. 1976 ). 3 7. 9 • lbtd. g4. 
1 Michael Binyon. ·•Bitterness uf ddcat rna) he directed at the West."' Tlrt• l'imt:s (L'nilttd 
1\inxdunz). n.d. Nttwsptlper .~·ourc:e Retrieved from l·.BS( ' ( )hm/ 
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bct~cen Gcnnuny ami th~: Soviet Union was signed in 19)9. the pwduction of anti-Bobhcvik. 
propaganda ceased. though ( i<~bbcls m<tde an effort to keep th~ separation bct\\ccn the Gcm1ans 
and Russian~ prevalent. Though the Bobhcviks \\Crc no longer rortraycd as u dangerous enemy. 
the racial difll'rl'ncel> bt!twl-en Gennans and So\'ict Slavs were emphasized in order to kc~p the 
separation !xtV.l"Cil the tw<> groups ... Gocbbels. v.ho evident!) ~a'" th~ pact from th~: outs\!t for 
\\hat it rcall) was -a political-power alliance for a limit\!d period and therl.'l(m: tried to 
prc\'c:nt the emergence of a pro-soviet climate of opinion ... 11 This approach madl' it easier for the 
Ministry uf Propaganda in 1941. when the Germans launched Operation 13urbarossa. to revert 
back to anti-Ilclbhc\il materials. though thi..; time '' ith a ditlcrcnt angle. 
In (ioebbcb · cnnfcrcncc v. ith leaders of the Ministry of l'ropuganda nn S July 19~ I. he 
outlined the ~vi~· re\ iscd approach to k\\-ish-Bol,.hcvism: 
Gem1any''> o,quMmg ol ac~uunll> w11h Mo'iCov. 1~ nov. unco,·enn~ and 
unmaslo;ing the greateo;t Je"' "h <;\\ indk of all times. The · v.orker~ · p3rut.ll'c · is 
"""' n:\oealcd 111 the world a' a gigantic s~ :.tern of che3h illld c\plullcr.., 111 
v.hu;h the \~nrl.cr\ arc Ctlfllpclled b) the mo'it l:llood) terTCirll.lllllll h1 li\c in a 
mdc~nhllhl) pitiful cxilltcnct in inhuman condllltln~ . Thi.' sy~em \\hen: Je"'· 
CBpltAJI'it\ and Uolshcviks ....-orl.. hand in glo\e, hao; crca1cd a Quite rn~oncci\\lhlc 
tkgrcc Ill hurnC\n depra" II) What million\ of< tt~nnan troc.1p~ arc '>ecin~ I here 
todn) i'>api,·turc of the lov.c\1 possible sociallh ing 'ltdn!J.lrd lrom the pruful 
hmcb ami Ike-ridden homes. ncgkctcd roJd, ant.llilth) "1113!-!C' to the be~tiJI 
dr.tbnc" (If lhctr cntir~ C'Oistence. B) me am ol thcu dtahoh~al '~ \tc.'m ot 
Bol!>hc' ism. the Jcv. s ha\ e t:&'l'>t lhc pct)plc l'f thl· ~~\ 1ct t niun JOlt' thr~ 
uu.,po.·.tl....thl~· clmdUJon ot dcepc ... t human mi.,el') The mn'll. hM nov. hecn tom 
uiT thr~ ~reate\! C<llllidencc trick c.'\cr pructkcd in the hl\hJry ul mankind I he 
'''u~lc m the hl\t me.tn' the lihcration (.If m.ml...md from ''' ~.nn•c 1 ~ 
Go~bbcls U"il-d infomtati()n l)f condition~ in the So\ ict Union. v. hil:h Gcmlan soldiers SO.I\\ as 
they marched through th~ country a.; evidence against Jc\\S and Bol..;heviks. !'his evidence ufthe 
11 Willi A Bocld..c. cd .... Praised be what makes us hard.'' in Ute! ,\'ec:rt•t ( 'on{im•nct!l of 
/)r (jm•hhe'l": 71tt' .\'cd l'rOfXlfUmda Wur, 1939-.fJ. 2"11 ed .• tmns. F\\ald O~rs (N~w York:. 
E.P. Dutton. 1970). 16. 
12 Willi A. Bodck.c. ell., ··The \eil drops." in 1nt! .'tt•crt•t ( 'ml/erfn,·e.-. olDr. Gm:hh,•f,. · 
The Na=t Pmpuxundu War. 1939-./3. ~nd cd .• tram •. l:.wald Oscrs (New York: E.P. Dutton. 
1970). 177. 
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cllccts of Unlsh\!\ ism. which \\as attributed to Jewish influence. resulted in l\\n main mco;sagcs 
that \\\!rc sent through Nvi propaganda. Fin,t was the continued emphasis of the contmst 
hctwccn the Slavs. who were vulncr.1bk to the intlucncc of Oolsbevism. and the <il·nnans. 'J hi~ 
l(x:u~ coincided\\ ith tht.: s~onJ emphasis. \\.hich wa<> the ml'll\.-ctiw and destructi\e nmun: of 
Bolshl!vism. I hcsc l\\ u t~mcs \\'ere used not necessarily to generate feelings of hostilit) 
tO\\ards the RtL,sian JX.'Oplc in gencrdl. hut to steer public opinion away from Bobhc' ik 
~ympathies . .. [here is only one !>logan \-\hich must he proclaimed again and again. <md that is 
our light against Bolshevism." Gocbbcls asserted Juring another Ministr) ()f PmrmganJn 
confcrence."Today Ru~sia is waging her war under the slogan of nationalism and can theret(m: 
lind support among all sccuons uf the narion. Our propaganda slogan for the [a~t mu ... t thcrcl'ilrc 
he that \\Care not against the Russian nation but only against Bubhcvism.''IJ <.il)Cbbcb 
alsnlikcned the Bolsheviks ooth to bacterium and to rdt~. "hi~.:h can sun ive in \\U~ condition~ 
than domc~tic animal~ ~cau!>C they an: used to Ji .. in~ among lilth.14 These comparisons \'ten: 
a)~) tmnslatcd into 'isual ao;s<>eiations in poster propaganda. 
Follo\'-ing the Gcm1an defeat at Stalingrad. anti-Rol~hc' i~ ml-ssagc::. hl'Camc the primm: 
fow~ ofNa:ti propaganda. On 12 l·cbnwry· 1943. just at\er the Ocrman army surrcndcrl-d at 
Stalingrad. ( iucbhcls urged the leaders of the Ministr) of Propaganda lhut "the struggle again~t 
Bobhcvi!>m and the danger of the Bolshe\ ization of [:uropc arc at present occupying our friends 
and cn\!mic~ in an e~ual mca,urc. Our struggle against Rolshc\ b.m must no\\ dominate all 
13 Willi A. Boclc~c. cd .. "Do you \\ant total war?." in J11e Seaet ( 'on(erence.'i of Dr 
<.ioehhds: The Ned ProP£tKCJndu War. 1939-./3.200 ed .• tram •. F\\ald Osc~ (Nc~ York: E.P. 
Dutton. I q70). 320. 
,_.Willi A. Roclc~c. cd .. "Don't be too lair.- in Th«> ,\'ecrt!l Cunlerencc•s of Dr (jot•hhels. 
11w .\"azi l'ruJXIRanda War. 1939--13. ::?nd cd .• trans. 1:\\ald Oscrs (N~w York: F.P. Dutton. 
1970). :!54-5. 
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pro(l3ganda media as the grc<tt and all-rcrvading propaganda themc.''1 ~Uoebbels alsll 
emphasized the importance of Nazi propaganda using the fear of Bnbhcviks ovemmning 
(iermany as incentiH: to maintoin suppon t(,r the Gcmlan army. ''The theme ·F.urope as a 
Ru-.sian slave camp: v.hich Goehhd~ played on right up to the end. \\<JS undoubted!) cticctivc 
in keeping the Germans lighting. ·strength through f'i.--.u-' he calkd it.''u' rhc Ministl) of 
Propaganda used thc~e I undamcntal thl'mcs to spread a picture of v. hat could become of 
(il'rmany ... lfthc Russians penetrated into Germany.IG<ll'hhdsJ \\antL'tJ. the young <.icm1an 
m:.mhoo<.l would he carried off to Siberia \"thile her \o,.omanhood would he deliH~red to the lust of 
!><.l\'agcs from the stcppc~.''17 And. the Na7is added. the destruction and dt.-cimatJon \\Ould not 
~top in German~. Hitler a.-,scrted that .. the Jcv.ish-Bol~he\ ik rulers alone have end~,·ored. from 
Moscuw during the past t\\O decades. to s~:t on tire not only Germany. but th.: \\hole of 
Europe.''18 In order to prove this point. and to counter the spre;:sding rumor that the Uobhc\ iks 
v.ould only kill those in the l'-iati pnn~. uoebbds cncourctgl!d the spread of propaganda that 
shov.ed victims \\ho v.crl.! .. workers and other members of the broad mas~-. in the tcrritoric~ 
u\crrun h) the Bolsheviks:'1Q The German defeat at Stalingrnd and the fear it produced \\ithin 
the f'.i.vi pan~ hl!a\'il}' intlucnct!d the messages of their lmti-Bolshe\'ik propaganda. both in 
tl'Xtual content and vi•mal communication. 
• • • • 
In order to con\e} messages otbout the Bolshc\ il' in their propaganda. the Ministl)' of 
Propaganda employed certain l!!>tabli~hl'd fundamentalc; of design in their posters. I hl' usc of 
IS Bodde. "Do )'OU \\Wlt total war?". 330. 
16 Rhodes. 37. 
17 Ibid. 37. 
111 Zeman. 100-1. 
1
"' Docld .. c. "Do )'OU \\ant tutal warT. 333. 
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the:se fundamental., allm\cd the Natis to e:mphasi7e and reinforce the messages that \\en: spread 
throughout their propaganda campaigns. Some vi~ual messages wen! more uhvious than ntlu:rs. 
Sinc:c: 'buaJ communicati ... m through design ,.,as not an area in '' hich the typical O~nnan civilian 
was proficient. the mc!-.sagc!-. wen! often arrived at subconsciously. AknO\\Icdgc: of design •md 
the methods of visual communication can help one discern lum the theme'> the Nazis mh:ndcd to 
tmnsmll regarding the Bulo;hevib \\crt: intu~cd into the 'i:-.ual dc~ign and layout of Na1i 
propaganda poster.,. 
There arc fiw basic principles of design: unit). emphasis. balance. rh)thm and contrast. 
In addition. there arc other thc..~rics of d(."Sign that can contrihutc to visual communication. T-...o 
important theories for the analysis ofNv.i propaganda arc those of color and cyeflow. l'he US\.' of 
these principles and theories. and the -;ucccssful interaction hl:twecn them achico,.e visual 
communication. I'hcrc arc abo rules that accompany the usc of the principlcl- of design. and the 
intentional breaking of these guidelines creates tension and discord in a composition. v.hich can 
serve just as much tu communicate as follo"ing the rulc11. 
The principk of unit) cre<th!s the Ji!cling that aJI the ckments that arc contained in n piece 
belong together and \\ere meant to he tn the composition. "Unity means that a congruity ur 
a~rccmcnt exists among the elements in a design: they look as though the} hclong to"cthcr. as 
though some visual connection hcyond mere chance ha.; cau~~ them to come togcther.''20 l 'nit} 
can be created h) placing the elements in the same area of a composition. by repeating the ~amc 
dcmc.!nt. sometime:. "ith a variation. or hy connecting the dement~ of a composition hy eydlow. 
The principk of cmpha11is is t:rucial to design. and especially tor the designers of Na.ti 
propagaru.Ja. Emphasis reveals the ohjcct th.u ... hould he considered of greatest imponancc in a 
20 David A. Lauer and Stephen 1\~ntak. De ... ign Ba.\·ic.\, (Boston: Thomson Wads\\urth. 
2()()g). 27 
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compusition. A ln~ul point is mndc: to ~land out from th~ r~sl of th.: pi..:ce. either by being a 
ditli:rc:nt color or \laluc than its surruunding. or by a difli.>r~ntiation in si1c. A designer rna) alow 
~ cyeflow to direct the vic"er"s attention to the focal point. or literally set the object apar1 hy 
isolating it from C\ crything else in the piece in order to dra'" attention to it. B) making one par1 
of a piece stand out. the principk of emphasis shows the viewer , .. hat to thm~ of as the rnnst 
important element of the composition. 
Balance in terms of design can he defined a.' -the di .. tribution of\ i~ual v.eight \\ithin a 
composition:'21 If u composition is halanecd. the ·'visual wdght ... or attention that is attracted 
from each elem.:nl. \\ill he ettual on both sides of the pi~e (top and bullnm. or right and left). A 
balanced image presents the mc~sagc of stability and security. When a composition is 
unbulanced. ··a ccnain vague uneasi~ss or dissatisfaction results. We ted the need to rearrange 
the dements in the ~e way that \\e automatieall} straighten a picture on the ''ali ."'12Balancc 
can he dthcr ~)mmctrical. in "hich hc.lth sides contain th~ !lame ckmcnts in the same pattern. ur 
asymmetrical. "hic.:h is composed uf diiTcrent elements that ar.: armngcd in a way that dnt\\S 
c4ual ~mention to both sides of the composition. This t} pe of balance can he achi~v,:d thruugh 
color. pattern. or the negative space (areas that surround the item). By cith~o-r making thl! 
composition balanced. or intentionally removing the stabilit) that a balun~ed piece produces. a 
d"signer can impress a mood or fcding upon his viewer. simpl~ by heing aware of where he 
places each piece of his design. 
Rh)1hm. in the context of d~sign. refers to the movement l)f the Yicwer' s eye a~o·ross a 
piece and the repetition of elements throughout the e)cs' path. The "rhythm" that the clements 
create for the eye can he smooth. spread out and flo~ing. or vef) regulah~d and e\'en regiment~o-d . 
21 Lauer and Pcnuk. 90. 
22 Ibid. 90. 
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The later gives a pi~c~ a structun..-d. planned look. ·while the fonn~r creal~!\ a sense nf 
disorganization or improvisation. 
The final principle of design is contrast. In a cumposition, .. Contr.1st stresses the' il>u<.~l 
diffcn:nccs in si7c. shape and color bct''"-cn the clemcnb to ~nham:c the ~rccption of a m~-.~gc 
intended. Contra!lt al~o draws and dirt."t:ts \'icwer's attention to specific arcus of infonnation.''1l 
Contra!\l is used to articulate the hierarch~ of imponancc of the components of a piece to the 
viewer. It can be a.: hie\ cd h} val') ing the size. shape. value or color of an object. and can be usc:d 
to create a focal point or to direct eyeflow. 
In addttwn to the principles of design there are theories of design. two of" hich are 
csp.-cially important to the analysis ofNv.i propaganda and the messages regarding the 
RnlshcviLs that \\ere intended to be o.cnt through the visual aspects of their design. The tirst of 
these theories is color. Euch color contains three properties: hue. \'aluc ami '\aturation or 
intensity. Hue is the technical tcnn li>r ''hat is generally meant by referring to "color"'. Red. 
omngc. yellow and green arc examples of hue. The term "color .. refers to the more s~cilic 
variation of a hu~. depending on its value and intensity. I h~ value of a color measure!- the 
lightm .. -ss or darlncss of a hue. Adding "'hite to a pur~ hue is r~f~rr~ to us tinting. "'hilc adding 
blael is kn0'-''11 a.-. shuding. The value of a color increase~ or decrcast:s depending on the amount 
of"' hite or hlad it contains. Inc linal property of color is intensity. or the brightness of a color. 
I h~ intensity or perceived intensity- of a hue is afTcck"d hy its complement. According to color 
theory. a hue's compliment is its opposite on the color whcd. Thus. r~ and grL-cn. orange and 
blue. ~clio\\ and \iolet. are complementary hues. Mixing a hue with its complement ''ill 
dccrea~c the intensity of the color. Eventually. if enough of the comph:mentary hue i~ add<."<.!. the 
2J [·l iLabcth Resnick. /.k!liKil tor ( 'ommunicatimr: t.'onceptuul wapltk Jestgn hask!f 
cllobokcn. NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 2003). 25. 
color ,.,.;11 become grc) or bro\\11. On the other hand. a colors intensity rna~ he visually 
increased so the color ap~ars brighter and mort:' ihrant by placing it next to its complement. 
Color theory .. md the interaction hctwccn colors play vcr} important roles in \'isual 
comnlunication. especially in the works of Nazi posh:r propaganda. 
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A second theory that is valuable in the: analysis of the visual communic~llon of NU/.i 
propaganda is that of eyetlow. A designer considers \\hat he puts in a composition. and \\here he 
places it in order to first dra" ..  the vie\\ers attention to the pi1.'Ce and thc:n din~'' the eye through 
the piece. usually ending \\ith or returning to the focal point. Eycflow can he conducted through 
lines. real or implied. from one objc..-ct to the next~ or the arrangement of shapes. When a human 
or am mal is depicted in a composition. the' icwcr natur.dl) tends tn look at the eyes Jirst. then 
fnlluw the line of sight nf the imuge. A designer can usc this kno\\ ledge hl direct eyetlow in a 
piece that includes living creatures. 
The interaction of the principles of design rarely '>tand on their O\\n. Most often. thc 
ckmcnts of the principles overlap multiple times in one composition. For example. color can he 
used to create a focaJ point. while simultaneou!>ly creating a sense of unity though the color 
~chcmc. rhe arrangement of identical objects can establish unity. halam:e .md rh~1hm. Although 
individually dcfmcd. th~ principles of design interact and intc:rt" inc "ith each other to 
communicate through a design piece. 
Knowing the principles of design is n~.--cessar) to und~n.tanding the \ isual communication 
a pic<.·c contains. llnwcver. it is also important to w1dcrM:md that th..:sc principles can be tluid in 
thc.·ir application and interpretation. Bc.:au .... e of the uni"{UC clements in a compo<iition and the 
\3r)ing interaction ~t\\ecn the dill~n.·nt pans and principles contained in a design piece. 
gcneraliLcd translation of visual communication cannot be clc:anly applied to every design. But if 
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un~ und.:rstands that the individual dements of a composition \\ere arrunged as they \\Cn: for a 
reason and is a\\ arc of the principles of design. underlying messages int..:ndcd hy the designer 
can he.: uncoH·rcd. 
• • • 
With knc.w.Jcdgc of the clements of design. it is possible to analyi'e the VIsual aspect of 
"hat the pi~e is communicating. and the extent to which Na~i designers infuS4!d th~:ir 
compositions , .. ith dements that produced c:xtremdy negative.- messages regarding th~: 
Bobhcviks becomes very apparent. The tollowing anal~sis ust!s examples of Nazi anti-Bobhc\ ik 
propaganda to illustrate lht! ways in \\hich the Nvi propaganda otlice used design clements in 
their posters. 
·1 wo examples of Nui <mti-Bul~he\ il propaganda wmc from the Gn:at Anti-Bul .. hc\ il 
Shm\. I his exhibition was a collection of propaganda pk-cc~ created hy the Central Prnpaganda 
Ollicc. and tra\ ckd to major German cities in order tu spread the inl(mnation through the Rcic.:h. 
1 hi.' exhibition \\as st•t up as an cducationul exhibit of motcri:lls. and \\<L'> accompanied by a 
booklet discussing what t~ l'a~is claimed -...as th~ dangerous nature and ne~ativc etTects of 
Bnbhc\ ism in Rus~i•t. It also scr\cd to dra~ connc~:tionshct-...ccn the concept of Bolshevi~m <md 
the: Jews. I he ~:xhibit was displayed throughout Gemmny from 1937until I 939. when anti-
Bolo;hc\ il propa~anda \\cnt dormant a.-, a result of the II iller-Stalin pact. 
The poster fur the Great Anti-Bolshevik sho\\ in lkrlin (Image A) is an example of how 
VIsual d~m~nts \\ere u~cd to spread meaning in Na~i propaganda. I he artist is unkno-... n. hut 
hccau~c it '~""a product of the Propaganda Ollice. < iocbbcl~ -...ould ha\'c approved the piece: 
hcli.lre it was displayed for the public. The title of the poster is ··B(llshevism l'nmaslcd··. J"hc 
pmJ:!mm that accompanied the cxhihit expounded upon the idea of the .. mask .. that the show -
14 
supposedly rcmo,cd Soviet Russia was called the .. worker"s paradise ... Ho"'~ver. the 
propaganda pamphlet state!> that ··Behind this peaceful mask of an impos)ihlc and insane vision 
of human happinc~s ... ,.,.a., the li.>undation of the Jewry's plan to build an -.cc.:urc \\nrld ruk'', and 
that "Incapable of any creative accomplishments. I Ru.-.sia · s Jewish leaders] dc~troy all Sl>Cial 
order. destroy all culture and all ethnic life. creating chaos in '' hic.:h humanity threaten~ to 
collap~e.''2<4 The poster reflects the argument that the linl-;hc' ik is responsible l(>r dc<llh und 
dc:,tructiun of civili1.ation. l'bc poster sends the message thut if Uolshc' ism spreads. communists 
will kill and destroy anything in thdr path. ·1 he artist uses the visual ckmcnts of linc/cycflow. 
pcrsJX!Ctive. color and c.:ontmst to send these messages. 1 here is an implied line from the head of 
the dead m~n m the bottom left comer that continues upwan.l and diagonally through the 
Bolshevik ·ll robe to the whip. and «."nds in the upper right comcr ••t the Bul-;hcvi~ ·.,. lace and 
upraised hand lhis creates a \isual connection bet"~" the Bolshc' ik·~ action~ and the d!!ath of 
the man in the lm,cr left. The entire composition accentuates this line. through the llam~s in the 
background and the Bol~ihc:vik's body. This line also addo; to the clement of perspective, which 
makes the: Bol'he' ik appear to he larger than lite anc.l looming over his victims. I he colors that 
arc u~cd abo add to the visual mc~sagc that is ~nt through the poster. Red and gn:cn arc 
complementary coiLns. and so when placed next to each other. as they nrc in the dead man's skin. 
his blood and th'-• tlamcll in the background. they make each othcr appear more vibrant. ·1 he red 
make~ the tinted gn:cn s~in appear sickly. and the low-saiUration green contrasts with the high!> 
satur ..ucd red of the blood. making it look more' ihrant and shocking. I he contmst bct\\ccn the 
light colors used in the victim) and the dark colors used on the B{'lshc\ i~ also add to the nc~ativc 
24 RanJalll3yt"crk. "The Great Anti-Bolshc\ist E:-.hibitiun:· 1937. accc~~'d I-I April 
201 :!: a\ ntlabh: from http: ''""'' .cal\ in.'--c.Ju acadc=mic/cas•gp..l ~ulti-tl\1bhcvi~m.htm: Internet. 
messotgc that is sent through this poster about the Bolshl!,·iks. along \\ ith other pi ecce; in the 
Ore at Anu-Bolshc\ jl; Sho" . 
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Inc Great Anti-Bolshevik Sho\\ contained other anti-Bol!.hc\ iJ.. propaganda rosters 
created by tht> 1\;a~is . The poster advertizing the exhibition (Image B) also dc:monstr.ttc!'> hm.\ 
'1sual dement~ "crc u~d to convey messages in N.vi propaganda. As with the prc\-·ious image. 
the artist of for this po~tcr is unknown. hut it was also part of the Great Anti-Bol!->hevi!oot 
h:hibition that was crcutcd by the Central Propaganda Ol1kc in I 93 7. lhe poster sends the 
mcs..al!c that it is the Bolshevik goal tn take over the world. Thi~ rcHccts the mcs~gc that the 
N.vi part~ attempted to spn:ad ahout the Bolshevists. and complements the content of the Great 
Anti-Oolshc\'i!lm l:.~hibition. I he artist uses complementilr) colors to make the rcdish-orange 
~tand out more and appear more vibrant. B) using a hum<m "kull fur the spider'~ head. the anist 
gives the villain human qualities (or gives the Bolshc\ ilc.. negative. spider-like qualities). There 
arc also significant messages associated with the image of the spider. B) using a spider to 
rcpn:~nt Bol~hevism. the propa~nda poster connt."Cto; the negative aspects of ~riders to the 
Nazi's enemy. The spider can be linked to the! idea of a predator that is about to kill and eat its 
pre}. the ns1>0ciation with being trapJ.ll!d in a web. and the dangerous. pobonous nature uf 
spiders. By using a spider to visually re!present the Bolshevik.,, the Na~i Mini~try of Propaganda 
linked the B .. ll~hc" iks to ncgati\>c ideas of domination and ,teat h. The artist abo added an 
clement of discomfort b) por1m)·ing the Bolshc\ ilc.. spider much larger than life. In addition to 
gh ing the spider the apJ.ll!arancc of overshadowing it~ "ictims. this deliberate skewing of 
proportion visually reitcr-o~tcs the message that the Bol!!hcvib intended to take mer the entire 
world. 
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Another poster that emphasizes the claim that world domination v.a._ the goal of Jcv. ish 
Bnlsht:\ ih is " I he Jewish Conspiracy against Europe" (Image C). This poster v.as distributed in 
Fmncc in 194) during the.: (icm1an occupation. fhc intended audience ''a~ the citizens of 
occupied France. and wa-. circulated in order to justil)· the har.t~smcnt and deportation of Jcv.s 
that occurrell. and to knd crcdibilit) to preexisting stereotypes and intolerance of Jcv. ~ in 
France.2 ~As propaganda. the image served as an attempt to connect the ulliuncc bct\\ccn ureal 
Britain and the Soviet l Inion v. ith u malicious Jcv. ish plan of t.lnmination. This message is 
tlt:ratt:d hoth through tl~ text and the visual element~. 
l'hcre arc se\ cral 'isual element.; in pia} that a.'isist in the communication of the nlCs::.age 
uf the intended domination nf the Je\\s through Bolshevism. The emphasis of the piece is the 
slyly smiling Jev. ish face at the top of the piece. The viewer' s eye ts directed b) the implied line 
of the Jev. ' s line of sight to the center of the poster. v.hcrcthe pcr-;onificd Britain and Soviet 
L'nion an: shake hands. ~ccause of the line of perspc.'Ctive. the clasped hands appear to be do~cr 
h, the viev.cr than their bodies. thu" emphasizing the fa~t that th«!) ha\·e just made an agreement . 
The piece has a nearly symmetrical vi!luaJ balance. with one person on each of the sides <lf the 
composition. and text 'ituated on the top and bouom of the posh:r. In the center of the poster. the 
Jew· s face and the handshake on top are halanccd by the large landmas!t of l ~urope underneath. 
Color also pla)s an important role in the visual communication that takes place in thi~ pi'--cc. "The 
design is \\ell exccutt!d. \\.ith excellent usc made of the contrast' between the clear blue of the 
~ca. the Jeep red of Great Britain and So\ iet Rusc;ia. and the steely grey of llitlcr' s Europe. ··2" In 
addition tu the contrasting hues. the inh:raction be tv. ccn the Ji tTcring saturations and values 





contrihute interesting \'isual message~ tu the piece. ·1 he Jc~ is !>urroundcd by a d,uk value. v. hich 
giws him an ominou5 appearance. Also. b~ using highly satur:ltcd colurs of blue. red and )ellow 
l(lr most of the composition. then depicting the Jew '' ith a low-saturated. light tint of green 
ma~es the Jew appear sickly and diseased in comparison to the other dements of th~ 
composition. '1 hroughout the clements that appear in this po~tcr. negati\·c 'isual messagt.'~ 
regarding hoth Jews and 11olshc' ih that were intended li.u the occupied French arc apparent. 
Another mui-Bul~hc' ik. propaganda poster tho.tl wa!\ distributed in a Gcmum-occupied 
territory "a!\ entitled .. Never!" (Image 0). ·1 his was designed in llJ41 and cin:ulatcd in occupied 
lkloru'>sia after tht' Germans tx·gan their invasion of Russia. 1 he intent of the poster"~ to s~ay 
publk opinion tov.arJ the Gcrrnans. ~7 lne text reads .. Germany is lighting and your cflorts "ill 
'k.I\C Europe from Bubhcvi!.m:'28 I he image of the poster coincides with the message that 
Bolshevism was deadl} and to be feared. In the piece. 13olshevism is sho"n as a ravaging wolf. 
The focal point of the poster is the wolfs vi brand} red. blood) mouth. 1-rom the focal point. the 
eye is drawn up~ard toward the wolfs eyes and the hammer and ~id .. lc emblem stamped on the 
forehead. thu~ distinguishing it a!'> Bolshevik. From then:. I he viewer's eye lollm\s ttl.! line of the 
wolf's body to the sJ...ull al its feet. and tinally to tht: text ut the hotlom of the posh:r .. , he 
dements of thl· image at th\! top of the poster arc hal anced hy the dark tc:\t at the holtom. 
Contra~t pla)s a significant role in the visual communication ,,f thi!- piece. By maJ...ing the upper 
rig.ht comer of the poster dark. the artist creates the illusion that the wolf is emerging from a dark 
and dangerous place. Inc: majority of the composition has \'CI) little color. and v.h&~t culor is 
used it dull and \\ashcd-out. ll\i~ maJ..cs the \-ibrant red of the wolfs mouth to appear cvt!n more 
red. bloody and shocking. 
27 Young.. 3:!8-l. 
:!II Ibid 
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I he tina I poster in this analysis is titled "Victory or Bulsh\:vism!"( Image I:). rhe (ldSt\:r 
was designed by II an~ Sch" cit1cr "ho wasonc of the most rcnm'11ed graphic anists tor the Nat.i 
Ministry of Propaganda. This poster was created as part of a propaganda campaign in 19.t3 aner 
the Germano; were defeated at Stalingrad. The campaign \\as organized by the Na.t.i Central 
Propaganda Oflicc in respon~ to the German dcfcm by the Ru-.sians. 
As part of the campaign that it''~ created for. th~ poster is used to inspire Gemlans to 
tight aguinst the Russians aflcr the defeat at Stalingrad. The poster viliHcs the Bolsheviks .md 
presents an ultimatum ~tween winning and hctng o\l'n.:ome by Bolshevism. 'l'hc message that is 
sent is that bolshc'\ ism will le<ld to death and destruction. 'I his is communicated through vbual 
cllntrast bct\\Cen the lightncs~ of the Oem1an side of the durknc~s of the Rnlshc\ i~ side of the 
po~tcr. This contrast visually emphosi.t.cs the dichotomies of the Germans and Bolshe\iks. On 
thc lcli side of the poster. tht: Gcm1an is presented as f~minine. vulncrahlc tmd endangered hy the 
mu~culinc hrutality of the male Bolshevik representation on the opposite side of the po~ter. 'I he 
German~. dl!picted as u smiling mother and child. arc visually associated with happincs~ and 
nurturing. '"hich conlm~l strongly with the di!>tres~cd and dr:pmved images linked \\ith 
Bol~hevi!>rn. The Bobhcvik is also visually sho" n as tilth> and unkempt.'' hill! the Gcnnans are 
dean and tidy.The emphasized contrast hctwccn the Ocrmun.;; and Bnlshcvih in this poster is 
atccntLmtcd through the 'isual contrasts the poster contains. 
The poster embodies the ideal that a Genn~m ddcat \\ould result in the rise of 
communi!>m. and that this would in turn bring death. disca-.e and destruction on Gcnnany. as 
well ~''the violation of Aryan purity. The message would still he clear to the audience during tht> 
original campaign. but th~)' ma) nut haw jumped directly to the conclusion that thb pdster was 
propaganda and that the ~tui party \\US LJ) ing to inllucncc thcm against the Bolshc' iJ...s. 
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Through the usc of the clements of design. the propagandists of the N:u:i party 
emphasized and rcitcratc..-d the mt:ssages that were communicated in the text of anti-Bolshe\ ik 
propaganda posters.Bccause the visuaJ aspects of the posters were not often analy:Lcd by the 
<Judiencc. the communication of the design was more subtle and easily accepted than verba l or 
\Hittcn v..ords because it afTcctcd the subconscious feelings and thoughts. The points that Y.ert: 
made by the posters reflected the themes of the Naz.is regarding Bolshevism: that it v.as 
dangerous and would lead to death and destntction ofGem1an~ ifthc Jews v.·cre to fulfill their 
go:1ls through Bolshevism and invade tirst Gennany and then the rest of the world. Because 
designers for the Ministry of Propaganda \\ere able to manipulate the component~ of each poster 
to visually communicate these messages in a way that subconsciously supported und extended 
the impact of the written propaganda, their often unacknowledged contributions were invaluable 
to the success of what has become knov. as one of the most extraordinary propaganda campaigns 
in history. Stephen I leiter. a graphic design analyst who has researched tht! use of symbolism and 
branding in totalitarian regimes. concludcs,"Grnphic designers have power. They are used 
sometimes. They arc misused sometimes. But they contribute to the power of the state. They 
contribute to the power of a party.''29 
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